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Abstract
Humans hold unrealistically optimistic predictions of what their future holds. These predictions are generated and
maintained as people update their beliefs more readily when receiving information that calls for adjustment in an optimistic
direction relative to information that calls for adjustment in a pessimistic direction. Thus far this update bias has been
shown when people make estimations regarding the self. Here, we examine whether asymmetric belief updating also exists
when making estimations regarding population base rates. We reveal that while participants update beliefs regarding risk in
the population in an asymmetric manner, such valence-dependent updating of base rates can be accounted for by priors. In
contrast, we show that optimistic updating regarding the self is a robust phenomenon, which holds even under different
empirical definitions of desirable information.
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Introduction
Humans are optimistically biased when making predictions
about their future [1–8], including when estimating financial
profits [1], relationship outcomes [2], longevity [3], professional
success [4] and physical health [5]. In particular people habitually
underestimate the likelihood of negative events in their lives and
overestimate the likelihood of positive events (for review see [6]).
This well-known bias, termed unrealistic optimism [7] is observed
across age [8], culture [9], and species [10] and has a significant
societal impact on domains ranging from financial markets [11,12]
to health and well-being [5].
Recently, we have proposed a mechanism by which unrealistic
optimism arises and is persevered when confronted with counter-
evidence [13–17]. Specifically, we have shown that people update
their beliefs in an asymmetric manner – adjusting estimates more
in response to desirable information about the future than
undesirable (also shown by others, see [18,19]). Over time such
a mechanism will lead to positively skewed beliefs. The same
mechanism has been demonstrated to underlie the ‘‘superiority
illusion’’ [20–21] – the tendency to overestimate one’s abilities and
characteristics [22]. For example, Eil and Rao [21] showed that
people adjust their beliefs regarding their level of intelligence and
physical attractiveness when they receive information indicating
they are more intelligent and attractive than they had assumed.
However, they relatively fail to do so in response to information
suggesting they rate lower on these attributes than they had
previously thought [21].
An open question is whether the update bias exists only when
adjusting beliefs about the self [13–16,19], or whether it is
observed also when adjusting beliefs about the population at large
(base rates). This is important for understanding biases in risk
estimation for two reasons. First, when estimating own risk people
may incorporate both base rates and diagnostic information in
their calculations. For example, if someone is estimating their
likelihood of cancer they may consider the known frequency in
their population together with knowledge about themselves (i.e. do
I smoke? do I exercise?). Thus, a bias in updating base rates may
effect updating for self risk. Second, it has been suggested that
people tend to be optimistically biased when considering the self,
less so when considering others [7]. It is thus of interest to examine
whether or not the optimistic updating bias previously found for
self risk will expand to base rates.
To examine selective updating in estimating risk about oneself
and the population we adjusted the belief update paradigm [16].
Participants completed a revised version of the belief update task
where they estimated their own risk for 80 different negative events
and also estimated the base rates of these events. On each trial
they were then given explicit information regarding the base rates,
and in a second session they estimated both again (see Figure 1a,
procedure). The rationale in examining how participants update
their estimates of base rates when receiving this information from
the experimenter is that although a participant may recall the base
rate presented accurately s/he may be uncertain of the validity of
that information. For example, they may believe they have
additional/more-up-to-date information regarding base rates that
the experimenter does not know about. Thus when the participant
incorporates the new information into his/her existing beliefs they
may still do so in a biased manner.
The paradigm enabled us to quantify how participants adjust
their beliefs about the self and the population in response to new
information in two instances; (1) when they learn that the average
likelihood of encountering a negative life event is lower than their
own estimates (desirable news, Figure 1b) and (2) when it is
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greater (undesirable news, Figure 1c). To examine the robustness
of the bias we further investigated if the results differ if valence is
empirically defined in two different ways: (1) by comparing the
information presented, to the participants’ estimate of their own
probability of encountering a negative event (2) by comparing the
information presented to the participants’ estimate of the
population base rate. By asking participants to rate the extent to
which they found the information presented to them desirable or
undesirable we could also examine whether these subjective
ratings are driven more or less by deviations from: (1) estimations
of self risk (2) estimations of the population base rate. Finally,
additional experimental factors that may influence the results (such
as memory for the information provided and priors) were tested.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The study was approved by the UCL Psychology Ethics
Committee. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants. Thirty two individuals aged 18 to 33 participated in
the study (mean age = 22.93; sd = 3.64). An additional six
participants originally completed the task but were excluded due
to Beck Depression Scores above 12, indicating possible major
depression disorder. This is due to previous findings showing a lack
of update bias in depressed individuals [23]. All participants were
recruited from UCL psychology subject pool. Participants were
paid for their participation.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of eighty short descriptions of adverse life
events (e.g. passenger in a car accident, home burglary – see [16]).
For each adverse event, the average probability of that event
occurring at least once to a person living in the same socio-cultural
environment as the participants was determined from online
resources (Office for National Statistics, Eurostat, PubMed). Very
rare, or very common, events were not included; all events
probabilities lay between 10% and 70%. To ensure that the range
of possible overestimation was equal to the range of possible
underestimation, participants were told that the range of
probabilities lay between 3% and 77%.
Figure 1. Paradigm. (a) In each trial, participants were presented with a short description of 1 of 80 adverse events and asked to estimate how
likely this event was to occur to themselves in the future and how likely the event was to happen on average in the population. They were then
presented with the base rate in a demographically similar population. Finally, participants were asked to rate how negative/positive they found this
information. The second session was the same as the first except that the base rate was not presented and participants did not submit any ratings.
Examples of trials in which the participant’s estimate of the event occurring to themselves and the base rate was (b) higher or (c) lower than the
provided base rate. In the specific examples shown here, under either classification scheme therefore these trials would be categorized as desirable
and undesirable trials respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098848.g001
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Procedure
The paradigm was modified from our previous studies [13–16]
and depicted in Figure 1. Participants completed a practice
session before beginning the main experiment. On each trial, one
of 80 stimuli was presented on screen for 4s. Participants were then
asked to separately estimate how likely the event was to happen to
themselves in the future and how likely the event was to happen
on average in the population. In half of the trials the order of
these estimations was reversed (i.e. participants were first asked to
estimate how likely the event was to happen on average and then
to estimate their own likelihood). Participants were then shown the
actuarial frequency of the event in a demographically similar
population for 2s. Finally, participants were asked to rate on a 7
point scale (1 = Very negative; 7 = Very Positive) how negative/
positive they found this information. Participants had up to 6s to
give each estimation and rating. If the participant failed to submit
a response for either estimation or rating, that trial was excluded
from all consequent analyses (mean trials with missing response
= 2.50, s.d. = 2.78).
In a second session, immediately after the first, participants were
asked again to provide estimates of their likelihood and the
average likelihood of encountering the same events (order reversed
in half the trials) so that we could assess how they updated both
estimations regarding the self and estimations regarding base rates.
In half of the trials, participants estimated the likelihood of the
event happening to them and on average in the future. In the other
half of trials, participants estimated the likelihood of the event not
happening to them and on average in the future. We framed
estimations in these two ways so that differential updating could
not be attributed to differential processing of high and low
numbers. Furthermore, under such framing half the trials were
conceptually presented as negative events (i.e. divorce) and half as
positive events (i.e. – never divorce).
After completing the task, participants rated all stimuli on prior
experience [for the question ‘‘Has this event happened to you
before?’’ the responses ranged from 1 (never) to 6 (very often)],
familiarity [for the question ‘‘Regardless if this event has happened
to you before, how familiar do you feel it is to you from TV,
friends, movies, and so on?’’ the responses ranged from 1 (not at all
familiar) to 6 (very familiar)] and negativity [for the question ‘‘How
negative would this event be for you?’’ the responses ranged from
1 (not negative at all) to 6 (very negative)]. To test memory for the
information presented, participants were asked to provide the
actual probability previously presented of each event.
Data Analysis
All statistical percentages and all responses in the ‘not happen’
sessions were transformed into the corresponding numbers of the
‘happen’ sessions by subtracting the respective number from 100.
Trials were divided into ones in which participants received
desirable or undesirable information using 2 different classification
criteria:
1. Trials were classified as desirable when the participant initially
overestimated the probability of the event occurring to
themselves relative to the provided base rate. Conversely, trials
were classified as undesirable when the participant initially
underestimated the probability of the event occurring to
themselves relative to the provided base rate. Trials in which
participants’ estimates of their own likelihood were exactly
equal to the provided base rate were excluded from the analysis
(mean number excluded trials = 1.72; s.d. = 1.25).
2. Trials were classified as desirable when the participant initially
overestimated the base rate relative to the provided base rate.
Trials were classified as undesirable when the participant
underestimated the base rate relative to the provided base rate.
Trials in which participants’ estimates of the base rate were
exactly equal to the provided base rate were excluded from the
analysis (mean number excluded trials = 1.53; s.d. = 1.02).
For both of these classifications, we calculated update terms for
desirable trials as:
UpdateSelf Risk~First EstimationSelf Risk{
Second EstimationSelf Risk
UpdateBase Rate~First EstimationBase Rate{
Second EstimationBase Rate
For undesirable trials, update terms were calculated as:
UpdateSelf Risk~Second EstimationSelf Risk{
First EstimationSelf Risk
UpdateBase Rate~Second EstimationBase Rate{
First EstimationBase Rate
Update scores were entered into ANOVAs and follow up t-tests
were conducted.
Memory errors were calculated as the absolute difference
between the probability previously presented and the participants’
recollection of that statistic:
Memory Error~
Provided Base Rate{









Finally we calculated two estimation error terms quantifying for
each trial the difference between participants’ initial estimates and
the information presented:
Estimation ErrorSelf Risk~First EstimateSelf Risk{
Provided Base Rate
Estimation ErrorBase Rate~First EstimateBase Rate{
Provided Base Rate
To test whether desirability ratings were driven more or less by
the extent to which the statistical information differed from
participants’ estimations regarding the self or regarding base rates,
for each participant we separately correlated each set of estimation
errors with their desirability ratings. To statistically test for a
difference in the strength of these correlations accounting for the
additional correlation between the 2 sets of estimation errors we
compared these using Steiger’s Z-test.
Update Bias for Self-Risk and Population Base Rates
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Results
i. Is updating beliefs regarding personal risk & base rates
biased?
As detailed below, our results show biased updating for self risk
(see Figure 2). Specifically, updating for self risk is greater in
response to desirable information relative to undesirable informa-
tion under both classification schemes of desirability. However, for
base rates biased updating can be accounted for by priors.
(a) Updating of personal risk. Replicating previous findings
[13–16] classification scheme 1 revealed that participants updated
their beliefs regarding self risk more when the information
regarding base rates was better than their estimate of self risk
compared to when it was worse (t(31) = 6.09, P,0.01). This bias
persists under classification 2 when classifying desirability of
information as dependent on base rates (i.e. if information
regarding base rates is greater or smaller than participants’
estimate of these base rates). Participants were more likely to
update their beliefs about their own likelihood of encountering a
negative life event when the base rate was better than their initial
estimate of the base rate compared to trials in which the base rate
was worse (t(31) = 4.83, P,0.01). These results replicate our
previous findings of valence dependent updating [13–16] and
confirm that valence dependent updating for self risk is not
contingent on classification scheme.
As detailed below, these findings hold after accounting for
possible confounding factors. Specifically, as we describe in section
C, examining all additional factors and ratings revealed four
possible confounds: (1) under classification 1 ratings of past
experience differed for stimuli for which subjects received desirable
and undesirable information; (2) under classification 2 magnitude
of estimation errors differed for stimuli for which subjects received
desirable and undesirable information; (3) under classification 2
there were a greater number of trials for which subjects received
desirable information than undesirable information (4) initial
estimates of personal risk and base rates differed (this is true for
both classifications). When controlling for these additional factors
in the respective classifications a main effect of valence remained
(classification 1: F(29) = 8.02, P,0.01, classification 2: F(29)
= 10.72, P,0.01) confirming the robustness of the bias.
(b) Updating of base rates. Participants updated their
beliefs about the base rate more when the presented base rate was
better than their estimate of self risk, compared to trials in which
the base rate was worse (i.e. classification 1: t(31) = 5.58, P,0.01)
and also when the actual base rate was better than their initial
estimate of this base rate compared to when it was worse (i.e.
classification 2: t(31) = 2.43, P,0.03). As detailed below, however,
the finding is abolished under classification two when accounting
for priors.
Specifically, as we describe in section C, examining all
additional factors and ratings revealed four possible confounds:
(1) under classification 1 ratings of past experience differed for
stimuli for which subjects received desirable and undesirable
information; (2) under classification 1 and 2 magnitude of
estimation errors differed for stimuli for which subjects received
desirable and undesirable information; (3) under classification two
the number of trials for which subjects initially overestimated the
base rate and thus received desirable information was greater than
the number of trials in which they underestimated it and thus
received undesirable information; (4) initial estimates of personal
risk and base rates differed (this is true for both classifications).
When controlling for these additional factors in the respective
classifications a main effect remained under classification 1 (F(29)
= 4.59, p,0.05), but not 2 (F(29) = 0.64, p.0.4). Looking at the
latter in detail revealed that biased updating of base rates was
mostly contingent on the differences in the number of trials for
which subjects received desirable information and undesirable
information. With that covariant alone biased updating for base
rates was abolished (F(29) = 2.37, p.0.13). Without it the effect
remained (F(29) = 4.12 p = 0.05).
(c) Other variables (memory, familiarity, past
experience, perceived negativity, estimation errors,
number of trials). Below we detail our examination of any
experimental factors (i.e. memory, familiarity, past experience,
perceived negativity, estimation errors, priors, number of trials)
that might differ for trials in which subjects received desirable and
undesirable information. We do this under both classification
schemes and for both estimations of self risk and base rates. As we
described in sections a + b, update bias was re-examined after
controlling for any differences found in these variables.
Memory: To examine participants’ memory of the information
given, at the end of the session, participants were asked to indicate
the actual probability (as previously presented) of each event
occurring to an average person in the same socio-cultural
environment. Memory errors were calculated as the absolute
difference between the actual probability previously presented and
participants’ recollection of that statistical number. Participants
remembered information presented to them equally well,
irrespective of whether it was desirable or undesirable and
irrespective of whether desirable and undesirable was classified
according to method 1 (t(31) = 0.68, P. 0.50) or method 2 (t(31)
= 0.01, P.0.99).
Note that a participant may recall the base rate presented
accurately but be uncertain of the validity of that information. For
example, they may believe they have additional/more-up-to-date
information regarding base rates that the experimenter does not
know about. Thus recollection of these numbers and the
participant’s second estimate of the base rate may differ.
Comparing these two scores (i.e. recollection of base rates
presented and second estimation of base rates) revealed they were
not significantly different from each other, but there was a trend
(t(31) = 21.76, p = 0.09).
Familiarity, perceived negativity, past experience: Question-
naire scores revealed that participants did not rate events for which
they received desirable and undesirable information as differing in
familiarity (i.e. how familiar they are with the stimuli from friends,
family TV etc.) or negativity (how negative they perceive the event
to be) under either classification method (see Table 1). However,
under classification one participants rated events for which they
received desirable information as greater on past experience
compared to events in which they received undesirable informa-
tion (t(31) = 3.02, P,0.01). We controlled for this difference in
sections a + b.
Priors (first estimates and number of trials): In accordance with
past research (e.g. see 7), participants believed their own likelihood
of encountering a negative event was lower than their estimate of
the base rate (initial estimate of self risk was lower than estimated
base rate (t(31) = 24.30, P,0.01). This was observed in 84% of
the participants, suggesting they believed they would fare better
than average.
Furthermore, under classification 2 they would often overesti-
mate the base rate relative to the base rate presented to them, such
that the number of trials in which they received desirable
information regarding base rates was larger than undesirable (i.e.
ratio of desirable trials to all trials was larger than 0.5 t(31) = 4.93,
p,0.01). There were no significant differences in the number of
trials in which they received desirable and undesirable information
for self risk. We controlled for these differences in sections a + b.
Update Bias for Self-Risk and Population Base Rates
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Estimation Errors: As the magnitude of the update is likely to be
related to the magnitude of the initial estimation error (i.e. the
difference between the participant estimate and the information
provided) it is critical to examine for differences in the magnitude
of the errors for desirable and undesirable trials.
Under classification two there was a difference between
desirable and undesirable estimation errors for self risk (t(31)
Figure 2. Update for self risk and base rates under different classifications of desirability. Participants update estimates of their self risk
more when the information they received was desirable compared to undesirable. Participants update estimates of their base rates more when the
information they received was desirable compared to undesirable under classification one but not under classification two after controlling for
relevant covariates. Update calculated as first minus second estimation for desirable trials and the reverse for undesirable trials (positive values
therefore indicate a move towards the information presented). Error bars are SEM; *indicates statistical significance at a threshold of P,0.05, two
tailed after controlling for all relevant covariates. Trials classified as desirable when the participant overestimated the probability of the event
occurring and undesirable when the participant underestimated the probability of the event occurring: (a) to themselves relative to the provided base
rate; (b) in the population relative to the provided base rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098848.g002
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= 22.52, P,0.02). Under both classifications there were differ-
ences between desirable and undesirable estimation errors for base
rates (classification one: t(31) = 6.40, P,0.01; classification two:
t(31) = 2.40 p,0.03). We controlled for these difference in sections
a + b.
ii. Do estimation errors underlie desirability and update?
(a) Updating and Estimation Errors. Formal models
suggest that learning from information that disconfirms one’s
expectations is mediated by a prediction error signal that
quantifies a difference between expectation and outcome [24–
26]. We have previously shown that an analogous mechanism
underpins belief updating in this task [16]. Specifically, the
difference between participants’ initial estimations and the
information provided (that is, estimation error) predicts subsequent
updates, as would be expected from learning models [24]. The
strength of this association is indicative of learning. We have
shown that such learning is valence-dependent, being greater for
information that offers an opportunity to adopt a more optimistic
outlook than for information that calls for a more pessimistic
outlook [16].
Here, we ask if updating for beliefs regarding the self and base
rates are better predicted by estimation errors derived from beliefs
regarding the self and base rates, and how this interacts with
valence. To this end we conducted linear regressions for each
participant with both Estimation Errors of Self Risk (unsigned) and
Estimation Errors of Base Rate (unsigned) predicting: (1) Desirable
Update of self risk, (2) Undesirable Update of self risk, (3) Desirable
Update of base rate, (4) Undesirable Update of base rate, under
both classifications. Regression coefficients were than tested at the
group level.
As seen in Figure 3 estimation errors for self risk were better at
predicting update for self risk and estimation errors for base rates
were better at predicting update for base rates. In addition, the
strength of the association between self-estimation errors and self-
updating was valence dependent under classification one (t(31)
= 4.60, p,0.01), replicating previous findings [16]. Under
classification 2 base rate estimation errors gain more predictive
power in explaining some of the variance previously explained by
self estimation errors. This resulted in neither type of estimation
error alone showing a valence dependent difference in predicting
self update. Rather, there was a main effect of valence such that
estimation errors (of base rates and self together) were more
predictive of update in response to desirable than undesirable
information (F(31) = 4.78, p,0.05).
(b) Desirability and estimation errors. Participants rated
how desirable information was. We ask whether subjective
desirability ratings were driven by the extent to which the
statistical information differed from participants’ estimates self risk,
estimates of base rates, or both.
For each participant we separately correlated each set of
estimation errors with their desirability ratings across trials. There
was a positive correlation between desirability ratings and
estimation errors for self risk (mean r = 0.50, significantly different
from zero across the population p,0.01) and estimation errors for
base rate (mean r = 0.55, significantly different from zero across
the population p,0.01). Specifically, participants rated informa-
tion as increasingly desirable as the information provided diverged
from their own estimate such that the former was a lower number.
Steigers Z did not reveal a significant difference between the two
sets of correlations (Z = 20.5, p.0.60), suggesting that desirability
is associated with both.
iii. Effects of Question Order and Frame
To examine whether the question order (i.e. if subject estimated
their own likelihood first and then base rate or vice versa) and
frame (i.e. if they were required to estimate likelihood of the event
happening or not happening) influenced updating we conducted a
3 way repeat measure ANOVA on updating scores entering
question order (self estimate/base rate first), frame (happen/not
happen) and valence (desirable/undesirable) as repeated factors
under each classification. Two effects were revealed.
(1) An interaction between valence and order for updating self
risk under classification two (F(31) = 7.14, p,0.02) and a trend
under classification one (F(31) = 4.03, p = 0.05) was observed. The
interaction was characterized by greater valence-dependent
updating when subjects estimated their own vulnerability before
estimating base rate. This interesting result suggests that biased
updating is reduced yet still significant when we first consider
population base rates and only then our own likelihood
Table 1. Participants’ ratings of familiarity, prior experience, negativity, memory errors, initial estimates, number of trials and
estimation errors.
Classification 1 mean (SD) Classification 2 mean (SD)
Questionnaire and variables Desirable Undesirable Desirable Undesirable
Subjective Scales Questionnaire: All scales 1 = low to 6 = high
Familiarity 4.05 (1.04) 3.93 (1.16) 3.99 (1.09) 3.97 (1.16)
Prior experience 1.39 (0.37)* 1.23 (0.33)* 1.28 (0.31) 1.33 (0.36)
Negativity 3.97 (0.85) 4.09 (0.92) 4.05 (0.88) 4.01 (0.91)
Task-related variables
Number of Trials 36.75 (13.60) 39.03 (12.66) 45.38 (8.90)* 30.59 (8.35)*
Memory errors 14.06 (5.89) 13.46 (3.81) 13.83 (5.91) 13.82 (4.10)
Initial estimate self risk 44.28 (6.83)* 19.30 (5.28)* 35.79 (9.03)* 24.47 (8.05)*
Initial estimate base rates 41.97 (5.80)* 29.40 (5.17)* 41.94 (5.02)* 26.19 (5.02)*
Estimation Error self risk 20.37 (4.79) 18.90 (2.63) 18.32 (4.54)* 21.73 (4.23)*
Estimation Error base rates 20.47 (3.83)* 15.43 (2.00)* 18.87 (3.79)* 16.68 (2.63)*
*significant difference between desirable and undesirable variable (p,0.05) within same classification.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098848.t001
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(classification one; F(31) = 20.67, p,0.01; classification two;
F(31) = 6.39, p,0.05). This may be because initial self-estimates
tend to be more accurate when reported after estimates of base
rates (t(31) = 1.74, p = 0.09) and/or because undesirable informa-
tion of base rates may be more difficult to ignore under such
ordering. (2) A main effect of frame for updating of base rates was
found under classification one (F(31) = 5.40, p,0.05) with
updating for ‘‘happening’’ being greater than updating for ‘‘not
happening’’. However, the effect was not significant under
classification two, nor for self risk under either classification.
Discussion
Our results replicate past studies from our lab [13–16] and
others [18–19] in showing that individuals selectively update their
beliefs when estimating their own risk; updating their estimates
more in response to information that offers an opportunity to
adjust predictions in an optimistic direction relative to information
Figure 3. Regression coefficients predicting update from estimation errors. Estimation Error of self risk (i.e. the difference between a
participants’ estimate of self risk and provided base rate) significantly predicted update of self risk both for trials in which subjects received desirable
and undesirable information, and under both classifications. Estimation Error of base rate (i.e. the difference between a participants’ estimate of base
rate and provided base rate) significantly predicted update of base rate both for trials in which participants received desirable and undesirable
information, and under both classifications. Error bars are SEM; * indicates statistical significance at a threshold of P,0.05, two tailed paired sample t-
test after controlling for relevant factors; ** indicates significantly different to a mean of 0, one sample t-test (P,0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098848.g003
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that can reduce optimism. Importantly, our results further show
that valence dependent updating of self risk reported previously
[13–16] is not contingent on the specific method by which trials
are divided into ‘‘desirable’’ and ‘‘undesirable’’. In our original
task [16] participants estimate their own probability of encoun-
tering negative events and then receive information regarding the
population base rates. Trials are then labelled ‘‘desirable’’ if the
base rates provided are better than the participants’ estimate of self
risk and ‘‘undesirable’’ if the base rates provided are worse than
the participants’ estimate of self risk. Such a division has proved
useful when examining how the brain codes for the difference
between ones’ estimate of self risk and information regarding base
rates. Specifically, we have found in the past that the left inferior
frontal gyrus, medial frontal lobe and cerebellum track the
magnitude of the difference between a person’s estimate of self risk
and information regarding base rates when that information is
better than the person’s estimate of their own vulnerability, while
the right inferior frontal gyrus codes for the magnitude of such
errors when the information is worse [16].
One can imagine a scenario where an individual holds a
different estimate of their self risk and of the base rate and receives
information regarding the base rate that is worse than their
estimate of their self risk but better than their estimated base rate.
Under this scenario whether the information is desirable or not
may be ambiguous. In this study by asking participants to label the
information themselves as desirable or undesirable and dividing
the trials in two different ways (according to the participants’
estimates of their self risk and according to the participants’
estimates of base rates) we show that the two are highly correlated
and that the update bias exists under both methods of division.
It has been suggested that when estimating vulnerability a
person may take into account both population base rates and
diagnostic information to reach a prediction regarding personal
risk [27–28]. Thus, information regarding base rates will result in
adjusting both estimates of personal risks and estimated base rates.
Selective updating of either may lead to biased estimates for self
risk. Here, we show that updating of beliefs regarding population
base rates is not as robust and clear-cut as updating for self risk.
Specifically, biased updating for base rates could partially be
explained by priors; subjects tended to overestimate base rates
such that there were more trials in which they ended up receiving
desirable information. When accounting for this difference the bias
for updating base rates did not survive under classification 2.
Ample evidence suggests that people’s perception of their
vulnerability is biased in a positive direction [30]. This study
supports these past findings and demonstrates the robustness of the
effect as it is observed under different empirical definitions of
desirability of information provided. A bias in updating estimates
of self risk can have adaptive benefits that include increasing
explorative behaviour and reducing stress and anxiety, a factor
that has links with physical and mental well-being [5,29].
However, any advantage arising out of a reduced tendency to
learn from undesirable information is likely to come at a cost. A
pertinent example is the discounting of warning signs regarding
financial risk, which is widely perceived as a contributing factor to
the 2008 global economic collapse [31–32].
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